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a stochastic distance function approach. 
ALESSANDRA FERRARI 
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Email: a.ferrari@reading.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
The UK internal ma ket was one of the first European attempts to introduce a 
competitive mechanism in the provision of hospital services. The assumption 
was that competition would have led hospitals to increase efficiency in the use 
their resources. The aim of this paper is to analyse the effectiveness of this kind 
of reforms by measuring the changes in technical efficiency of a panel of 52 
acute Scottish hospitals observed from 1991/92 to 1996/97. The time period 
covers the whole duration of the internal market and the sample contains a 
different mix of both trusts and non-trusts, where the former embed the proper 
working of the reform. 
The selected model is a stochastic output distance function that includes an 
interaction dummy variable to allow for parameters to change over time. The 
results show a structural break after which hospitals change not only the way in 
which they provide their services, but also the kind of services they provide, 
favouring the quicker treatment of patients on a day basis. No significant 
improvement in technical efficiency is detected instead over time, nor any 
significant difference in efficiency between trusts and non trusts. 
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1. Introduction  
The UK was one of the first European countries to reform its health services1. As 
regards hospital services, a clear distinction was introduced between purchasers 
(District Health Authorities and GP fund-holders) and providers (hospital trusts). 
By becoming trusts hospitals were given more autonomy in the management of 
their resources and had to sell their services to the purchasers via contracts on the 
so-called internal market (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1994). Competition for 
contracts was thought to give hospitals incentives to efficient behaviour. Even 
though the “quasi-market” was formally eliminated in 1997, its main features 
remained in place. Other countries are now following in the same direction, and 
the debate about the efficiency and effectiveness of this kind of reform is a major 
policy issue (see for example Gerdtham and Lothgren, 2001).  
Not surprisingly the reform generated scientific interest, a lot of which of a 
theoretical nature, on the efficiency properties of different contracts or the 
credibility of competitive conditions on the market. The empirical work has been 
instead more restricted, especially when it comes to the analysis of efficiency 
changes (Glennerster, 1998). Among the main contributions, Propper (1996) and 
Propper and Soderlund (1998) studied the effects of competition on hospital 
prices and costs, and found some evidence of price reduction eventually mirrored 
in the costs, but mainly a great variability in prices that bore no respect to the 
average cost pricing rule advocated by the Government. The effects of 
competition on the quality of hospital services were the focus of Propper et al.
(2004) who found evidence of a decrease in quality associated to the working of 
competition. Studies of hospitals efficiency on more recent, post-reform data sets 
can be found for example in Jacobs (2001) and Street and Jacobs (2002), who 
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focused on the (lack of) significance of the differences in inefficiency between 
hospitals. Jacobs and Dawson (2003) showed the non-effectiveness of hospitals 
efficiency targets; these have become increasingly popular with policy makers, 
and their feasibility, as well as that of general efficiency analysis of public 
services, have been thoroughly analysed by Smith and Street (2003).  
Not many contributions exist instead about the effects on hospitals efficiency 
during the years of the reform, when competition was actively promoted as the 
key feature of the system. Among these studies, Soderlund et al. (1997) 
estimated a classical linear regression model on a sample of NHS hospitals in 
England for the years 1992 to1994 which revealed a general productivity 
improvement however not associated to trust status. Due to its easier availability, 
others have used the acute Scottish hospitals data set used in this paper 2. Scott 
and Parkin (1995) estimated a translog cost function for the years 1992/93 which 
highlighted the prevalence of constant returns to scale and economies of scope 
between different kinds of outputs. Maniadakis et al. (1999, 2000) used Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to calculate Malmquist indexes of total factor 
productivity (TFP) for the period 1991/92-1995/96, finding a general 
improvement in TFP mainly attributable to shifts of the frontier, and a worsening 
of the quality level3.
The aim of this paper is to analyse the changes in technical efficiency and 
performance of hospitals during the years of the reform by means of a stochastic 
distance function. As opposed to DEA, the stochastic parametric approach allows 
the statistical testing of hypotheses, making the results more reliable4. It also 
allows analysing the characteristics of the production process that a non-
parametric method by definition does not identify. Furthermore the chosen model 
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is a stochastic distance function (Coelli and Perelman, 1996) for technical 
efficiency, which is a frontier model as opposed to the classical linear regression 
one; as will be seen in Section 2, the frontier model specifically separates the 
noise in the data from the estimation of inefficiency, which is the aim of the 
exercise. The choice of a distance function form is due to the multiple output 
nature of the production process that rules out the direct estimation of a 
production function5.
Unfortunately, data for the whole of the NHS are not available; the analysis is 
performed on a sample of 52 acute hospitals in Scotland observed between 
1991/92 and 1996/97, thus covering the whole duration of the reforms. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The estimation of stochastic 
frontiers and the distance function model are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 
describes the data set. The model selection process and the results are in Section 
4, and general conclusions in Section 5. A final appendix details the additional 
statistical analysis performed to check on the robustness of the model. 
 
2. The stochastic frontier and the distance function. 
Following Debreu and Farrell seminal papers, the efficiency of a firm can be 
defined and measured as the distance of its actual performance from a frontier6.
If this frontier is the production function, i.e. the maximum attainable output 
from a given set of inputs, the distance will measure technical inefficiency. 
Following Shephard, this can be measured as a radial expansion Do for the output 
vector(s) in order to reach the frontier, where 0 < Do  1. If Do =1 the 
observation is efficient as it lies on the frontier, if Do <1, the observation is 
inefficient as it lies below it.  
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Econometrically, in the single equation - cross sectional case, a production 
frontier is usually estimated as7
lnyi = +’ lnxi +i (1) 
where  
i = vi-ui
is a composite error term in which 
vi ~N(0,v2) is the stochastic component and  
ui = -lnDo is the efficiency measure. 
The efficiency measure ui must come from a positively skewed distribution; for 
instance if this is a half normal (which will be used later), then 
ui = |Ui|
UiN(0,u2)
Due to the presence of a composite error term OLS gives consistent but 
inefficient slope parameters’ estimates, and the use of ML is to be preferred if the 
distribution of ui is known or an assumption can be made about it. 
Following Battese and Corra (1997) the influence of the inefficiency component 
can be measured by a parameter  = 2u/2, where 2=2u+2. The significance 
of  can be tested with an LR test which, if the null hypothesis H0:  = 0 is true, 
follows a mixed 	2 distribution. If the null hypothesis is true and inefficiency is 
not significant, the model is equivalent to a standard "average" production 
function, and its log-likelihood is the same as that of the linear model estimated 
by OLS. 
 
As (1) can be estimated only for the single output case, an alternative model has 
been proposed by Coelli and Perelman (1996, 2000) to deal with the multiple 
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outputs case. The idea is to directly express Do as a function of the K inputs and 
M outputs of each of the N firms. Using a log-linear translog function 
specification8 this is: 
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(2) 
Using the fact that Do is linearly homogeneous in outputs, adding the stochastic 
component vi and setting lnDoi =-ui,, (2) can be rearranged as9
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(3) 
 
where yM is the M-th output and y*m =ym/yM. Equation (3) can be now estimated 
as a usual production frontier, by regressing (the log of) one output on (the logs 
of) the inputs and (the logs of) the outputs ratios. Note that the coefficients of a 
production frontier correspond to the negative of the coefficients of a distance 
function. 
 
3.  The data 
 
The data are a sample of 52 acute hospitals in Scotland in the years 1991/92 to 
1996/97 (from now on referred to as 1992 and 1997 respectively), making a 
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panel data set of 312 observations10. The data set was actually reduced from the 
originally available one after a detailed analysis, motivated also by others’ 
concerns (Scott and Parkin, 1995), revealed that the information on some of the 
cross sectional units was not reliable. Furthermore, as suggested also in Smith 
and Street (2005), additional statistical analysis of the residuals has been 
performed to check for the reliability of the results and the robustness of the 
model. 
Coming to the definition of the inputs and outputs variables, the following 
choices have been made11. Output is usually measured as the total number of 
cases treated. Since cases are very heterogeneous they are usually divided into 
various specialty (or casemix) categories, which qualify the hospital as a 
multiple-output unit.  The use of index numbers can overcome the problem of the 
trade-off between heterogeneity and degrees of freedom as long as one can 
define weights that correctly represent the differences between cases. On the 
assumption that more difficult illnesses are more input demanding than the less 
serious ones, measures of their reference average cost are produced by the NHS 
and customarily used by the literature. 
This paper follows this approach and the weights reflect the average costliness of 
a case in each category, calculated for the whole of Scotland in order not to bias 
them with some measure of inefficiency of each hospital. Furthermore, to avoid 
average cost changes over time due to possible inefficiency changes, they have 
been normalised each year to sum to 1. In detail, if 
qjit is the total number of cases treated in category j by hospital i at time t, and  
cjit is the average cost per case in category j at hospital i at time t; then 
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
=
=
N
i
jitjt cNc 1
1. is the average cost (across hospitals) per case in category j at time 
t The weight for each category is calculated as 

=
= J
j
jt
jt
jt
c
cw
1
.
.
and so finally the index for each hospital in each year is 

=
=
J
j
jitjtit qwy
1
The many output categories have then been summarised in two indexes: one for 
the inpatients and one for the outpatients, day patients and day cases. The main 
difference between the two categories is that in the former patients spend several 
days in the hospital and in the latter no more than one day, sometimes without 
even using a bed (and the staff associated to it). As a substitution between the 
two kinds of services could have taken place, it was preferred to keep them 
separated, so the two final output indexes are y1 (index of inpatients) and y2
(index of outpatients, day patients and day cases). 
 
Finally, 5 variables identify the inputs: 
x1= total capital charges (£000) 
x2= medical staff FTE (full time equivalent); 
x3= nursing staff FTE; 
x4= other staff FTE; 
x5= total number of beds. 
The capital measure12 was deflated using the “Hospital and Community Health 
Services pay and price inflation values”. The “other staff” input includes 
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professional, technical, administrative, clerical and all other staff. The descriptive 
statistics of the data are reported in Table 1. 
[Table 1 here] 
4. The model 
The main problem encountered in the estimation of the translog output distance 
function was the modelling of time effects. A series of LR tests was performed to 
choose among alternative time specifications; this initially led to the estimation 
of model with intercept dummy variables for each year in the panel, like the 
following13:
ititteach
t
ttkitk
k
litkitkl
lk
kitk
k
it
uvDDyxxx
xyyy
+++++
++++=


====
=


5
1
5
1
4
1
5
1
5
1
2
11102
*lnlnlnln
ln*)(ln*lnln
(4) 
In the above, (the log of) the index of outpatients, day patients and day cases (y2)
is regressed over (the log of) the five inputs (x) and the outputs ratio (y* = 
y1/y2), plus five dummy variables to allow for a different intercept each year, 
and a dummy variable for teaching hospitals. A dummy variable for trust status 
could not be introduced because of the implicitly assumed correlation with the 
inefficiency component (the issue is discussed more in detail later). Following 
Battese and Coelli (1992), the inefficiency component was modelled as a 
function of time as 
uit = ui exp[-(t-T)] 
(5) 
so that a value of  > 0 (<0) implies increasing (decreasing) efficiency over time. 
A value of  = 0 implies no time effect, and the hypothesis can be tested by 
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means of an LR test. Equation (4) however produced unsatisfactory results; in 
particular, even though the model with the intercept dummies had been 
statistically selected against other time specifications, not all the dummies were 
significant, their overall pattern was counterintuitive and contradicting existing 
evidence (see for example Maniadakis et al, 1999, 2000, and Ferrari, 2006) and 
finally one of the inputs elasticities was negative. All this raised the suspicion 
that the effect of time had not been adequately captured, namely that a pooled 
model might not be appropriate and that all the parameters of the distance 
function, not just the intercepts, might have changed over time. 
As the use of Chow tests for parameters stability was ruled out for lack of 
degrees of freedom an alternative approach was used instead. This consists of 
estimating several times the distance function with a time interaction dummy 
instead of the intercept dummies. In particular, a time dummy d is introduced, 
which takes a value of 1 for a particular year(s), and 0 else, and this is multiplied 
to all the variables in the translog distance function, as: 
ititteachkitk
k
litkitkl
lk
kitk
k
kitk
k
litkitkl
lk
kitk
k
it
uvDdyxdxxdx
dydydyxxx
xyyy
+++++
++++++
++++=
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(6) 
 
The inputs and outputs of (6) are the same as those of (4), Dteach is a dummy 
variable for teaching hospitals and d is the time interaction dummy. When d=0 
the parameters of the function are the s, s and s; when d=1 they are the 
respective (s+s), (s+s) and (s+s). The inefficiency component uit varies 
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over time as in (5) and is modelled as a half normal distribution, since the LR test 
on the 0-mean of a truncated normal distribution leads not to reject the null 
hypothesis in all cases. 
The interaction dummy is first set equal to 1 for 1992 (and 0 else), then for 1992 
and 1993 (and 0 else) and so on. In this way 5 different distance functions are 
estimated, each with a different time effect which is captured by the parameters 
of the interaction dummy. The likelihood results of the five estimations of (6) are 
reported in Table 2. 
[Table 2 here] 
In each case the significance of the time interaction parameters is tested for by 
means of LR tests against a restricted model with no time effects and as expected 
the null hypothesis is always rejected. On the grounds of the Akaike14 
information criterion the model as specified in (6) is also to be preferred to the 
pooled one in (4). 
Since the models are not nested in one another but they all have the same number 
of parameters, selection by minimisation of any standard information criterion is 
equivalent to selection of the model with the greatest maximised log likelihood. 
This happens when separating 1992 and 1993 from all other years, as the model 
has about 27 points of difference in the log-likelihood from its closest alternative. 
This therefore points to the fact that the parameters of the distance (and 
production) function might have changed after 1993.  
The model in which 1992 and 1993 are separated from the following years is 
therefore analysed. The main results are shown in Table 3, which reports in 
order: the ML and OLS log-likelihood values, the estimated values of  and ,
the inputs elasticities and then the elasticity of y2 with respect to the outputs ratio 
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y* (ey*), the total input elasticity (or elasticity of scale) and finally the elasticity 
of substitution between y2 and y115. All elasticities are calculated at the sample 
mean and their significance is tested by means of an LR test that in all cases 
leads to reject the null hypothesis (i.e. all are significant)16.
[Table 3 here] 
The results of the estimation can be summarised as follows. The  parameter is 
significant (LR test is 337.62) meaning that so is inefficiency. Very interestingly 
however  is not: the result of the LR test (2.46) leads not to reject the null 
hypothesis that  = 0, so that no significant difference in (in)efficiency appears to 
have taken place over time. 
 
The most notable difference between the two time periods is the change in the 
elasticity of substitution between y2 and y1: the absolute value increases by 60%, 
implying that the opportunity cost of treating someone as an inpatient over time 
has increased considerably. A pattern has emerged towards treating patients more 
and more as day patients/cases or directly as outpatients. This is confirmed when 
looking at Table 1, that shows a very big rate of increase in the value of y2 as 
opposed to a relatively small increase in that of y1.
As regards the inputs, two variables improve their elasticity after 1994 (namely 
the nursing staff and the beds), and the other three lower it. Whether this is due to 
a change in the productivity of an input or just to a change in its levels can be 
revealed by testing for the significance of the relevant dummy variable 
parameters. This reveals that the increased elasticity of the beds input is a 
consequence of the reduction in the levels of the variable, well known also to the 
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general public via the news. This is also consistent with the aforementioned trend 
towards day-based treatment, as beds would in that case be used more 
intensively. 
The reduced elasticities of capital and of other staff are taken to be a direct 
consequence of the reforms. The increase in capital levels could be due to the 
investment in information technology that hospitals made in order to deal with 
the new contracting issues (Fattore, 1999). As this activity is not directly linked 
to the treatment of patients (the output variable) this might explain the reduced 
elasticity of the input. However, increased capital levels are also the consequence 
of accountancy changes related to the change to trust status, which made the 
hospitals owners of their assets, so concluding that there was overcapitalisation 
would be misleading. The data did not offer any other measure of capital but the 
one used, which has its limitations although its entire removal from the equation 
was rejected from the data; keeping this in mind, since no further detail is 
available, the result has to be taken with caution. 
 
Similarly, the “other staff” variable increases in level and its elasticity decreases 
from 0.33 to 0.12. One reasonable explanation is that administrative staff 
increased to deal with the new contracting issues. Another possibility is that the 
lower increase in nursing staff might have led to the transfer of some of their 
duties to cheaper but less qualified (and therefore less efficient) staff.  A pattern 
towards the use of cheaper labour inputs in Scottish hospitals was revealed by 
Gray et al. (1986), and this might have been reinforced by the financial concerns 
of the reforms. 
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Finally, the results also show a positive difference in the intercepts indicating a 
possible improvement in average productivity, that is a shift upwards of the 
frontier. Considering that the shape of the frontier has changed, the higher 
intercept could indicate that the improvement is mainly in the production of the 
dependent variable, i.e. again y2.
The fact that 1994 is the first year in which some hospitals start to change to trust 
status naturally leads as to think that is the reason behind the structural break. 
The relevance of trust status in explaining changes in technology and 
inefficiency is therefore analysed more in detail. One approach to do so is the 
estimation of a “one-step model” (Wang and Schmidt, 2002), which however 
failed to converge to a maximum. More sophisticated models are currently 
discussed by the literature and will be worth exploring for future research. For 
this paper the interaction dummy specification remains the preferred one. Using 
the estimates of (6), the elasticities of trusts and non trusts are calculated and 
compared to one another, as reported in Table 417. This shows that the pattern 
revealed by Table 3 after 1994 seems to be more marked for the trusts sample 
than for the other hospitals, which confirms the hypothesis that the change in 
technology is related to the change in status. However, no significant link 
between trust status and efficiency can be detected: a t-test on the equality of the 
mean inefficiency score, computed as E[ui

i ]18 of trusts and non trusts is 
performed and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (the p-value is 0.34). 
[Table 4 here] 
As mentioned in Section 3, to check on the reliability of the results and the 
robustness of the model specification, two additional pieces of analysis have 
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been performed and are reported in detail in the appendix. First we compare the 
theoretical density function of it with that of the estimated residuals; this shows 
that the model fits the data well and rules out the presence of outliers. Secondly 
for each hospital we computed the 2.5%, 50% and 97.5% quantiles 
corresponding to the conditional density function ),...( 1 iTiiuf
  . We find that 
there is very little overlap and thus that inefficiency is not only significant overall 
but also significantly different between hospitals.  
 
6. Concluding rema ks. 
This paper estimated a stochastic distance function to analyse the changes in 
(technical) efficiency and performance of acute hospitals in Scotland during the 
years of the reform. A structural break was detected in 1994, the year of the first 
trust wave, after which hospitals change not only the way in which they provide 
their services, but also the mix of services they provide. The opportunity cost of 
inpatients increases as hospitals tend to treat patients more and more on a day 
basis. This view is supported by the fact that both the number and the costliness 
of outpatients, day patients and day cases increase quite significantly, indicating 
a possible “swap” between the two categories of output considered. This could 
be the result of an attempt of hospitals at reducing their costs by reducing the 
length of stay, especially if the contracts constrained them to provide minimum 
levels of treatment (as it was the case especially with the widely used ‘block 
contracts’). The involvement in the new contracting activity, and the financial 
concerns that it brings with itself, appears also to translate into reduced inputs 
productivity. This at least seems to be true for the capital and other staff variables 
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(whose levels increase over time), and for the medical staff. Nurses and beds 
instead improve their productivity, and are also associated with the lowest 
increases in levels (with the latter strongly negative in fact).  
 
This increase in the day-basis treatment is also behind the shift upwards of the 
frontier. However, although technical inefficiency remains significant, it does not 
show any significant improvement.  
 
There are clearly limitations to this work, among which the non-availability of a 
specific quality measure and the relatively small sample size. With these in mind, 
the general conclusion that can be drawn from this work is that the reform did 
not unambiguously produce the expected efficiency improvements. The move 
towards day-based care might be going hand in hand with the reduction in the 
quality of treatment found elsewhere in the literature, and this makes the overall 
scenario not particularly optimistic. 
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Appendix. 
Analysis of the residuals of equation (4). 
In this appendix we provide a graphical comparison of the theoretical distribution 
of the composed error term, with an estimate of the density of the actual 
residuals. The theoretical distribution, resulting from a convolution, may be 
found in Greene (1997). For the density estimator we use a kernel method (see 
for example Silverman, 1986), with the standard plug-in bandwidth. For the 
relevance of this kind of analysis  see for example Smith and Street (2005) and 
Street and Jacobs (2002) for a similar application to hospitals efficiency. 
Figure A1 shows in order: the theoretical density of the composed error term i =
vi-ui
(with vi ~N(0,v2), ui = |Ui| and UiN(0,u2)), the estimated density of the 
residuals from the estimation of equation (4), and the distribution of the 312 
residuals. 
The residuals seem to be in broad agreement with their theoretical distribution 
and there are no serious outliers, indicating that the results are robust.  
[Figure A1 here] 
Figure A2 for shows, for the 52 hospitals, the quantiles corresponding to 
),...( 1 iTiiuf
  , and the quantiles corresponding to ),...( 1 iTioiDf
  , where 
iu
oi eD =100 . The very little overlap indicates that inefficiency is significantly 
different between hospitals.  
 
[Figure A2 here] 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the inputs and outputs variables (standard 
deviation into brackets) 
Average 92-97 Yearly rate of growth 
Inpatients index 141746 (125124) 0.3 
Outpatients et al. index 30342 (28349) 9.0 
Capital (£000) 1513 (1396) 1.6 
Medical staff (WTE) 88 (87) 4.1 
Nursing staff (WTE) 457 (360) 0.7 
Other staff (WTE) 302 (256) 4.0 
Beds 357 (272) -2.7 
Table 2: Log-likelihood of the translog distance function with time 
interaction dummy.
92 92 – 93 92 - 94 92 - 95 92 - 96 
 177.99 218.54 190.93 191.68 170.19 
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Table 3: results from the estimation of equation (4). 
Variable Estimate 
 218.54 
OLS  49.73 
 0.955* 
 0.02 
 1992-1993 1994-1997 
ecap 0.028* 0.005* 
emed 1.049* 0.672* 
enurs 0.156* 0.254*
eoth 0.334* 0.121* 
ebed 0.043* 0.289* 
ey* -0.493* -0.613* 
etot 1.611 1.341 
ey1 -0.973 -1.582 
* = significant at 5% (or less) ** = significant 1 at 10%. 
 
Table 4: partial elasticities of trusts and non trusts hospitals. 
 Trusts Non trusts 
ecap -0.001 0.022 
emed 0.667 0.687
enurs 0.252 0.259
eoth 0.121 0.128
ebed 0.308 0.207
ey1 -1.594 -1.506 
Page 24 of 26
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
24
 Figure A1: comparison of the theoretical density function of i with that of 
the estimated residuals. 
 
Figure A2: quantiles corresponding to ),...( 1 iTiiuf
  , and 
to ),...( 1 iTioiDf
  .
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
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1 White Paper Working for Patients (December 1989), NHS and Community Care Act (June 
1990, effective from April 1991). 
2 ISD Scotland, Scottish Health Service Costs, NHS in Scotland. 
3 Measured as the survival rate 30 days after discharge. 
4 See Jacobs (2001) for a discussion of the relative advantages of the two methodologies for the 
hospital sector, and Parkin and Hollingsworth for an application to the Scottish data set. 
5 This problem arises when estimating a production function as opposed to a cost function. See 
for example Conrad and Strauss (1983) and Wagstaff (1989). 
6 For an overview of the many techniques of frontier estimation, including more recent 
developments, see for example Sena (2003). 
7 Many comprehensive reviews of the stochastic frontier model exist in the literature; see for 
example Greene (1997) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). 
8 A more parsimonious specification like the Cobb-Douglas should not be used because, apart 
from other restrictions, it is not concave in the output dimensions. 
9 The detailed explanation is omitted for reasons of space and can be found in Coelli and 
Perelman (1996, 2000).  
10 The data are from the Scottish Health Service Costs statistics. 
11 See in particular McGuire et al (1983); Tatchell (1983); McGuire (1985); Butler (1995). 
12 This was the only available capital measure in the data, and it comprises: a) depreciation on 
fixed assets; b) interest paid on money borrowed to finance any of the projects in a); c) a 6% 
return on capital (trusts only). Even though not ideal its entire removal from the estimations was 
rejected by the data. 
13 Since this first model was eventually discarded, for reasons of space the details are omitted, but 
they are available in a previous longer version of this work (Ferrari 2004). 
14 The Akaike information criterion is used to compare models that are non nested in one another. 
It is specified as AIC = -2 + 2n where  is the value of the maximised log-likelihood and n is 
the number of parameters. The preferred model is the one with the lowest AIC value. 
15 The details of the calculation of the elasticity of substitution are in Ferrari 2004.. 
16 The presence of the squared and interaction terms makes the translog prone to 
multicollinearity. As a consequence it is usually advisable to test for joint parameters’ 
significance rather than relying on their individual ones. 
17 In particular these are calculated at the average sample values in 1994 and 1995, which are the 
years where a reasonable mix of trusts and non trusts exists. 1992 and 1997 in fact have 0 in one 
category, and 1993 and 1996 have 7 or less in one category. 
18 See Greene (1997) for a discussion. 
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